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Abstract 
Impact of coordination costs and market size on a firm’s choice of technology is studied in 
a general equilibrium model in which firms engage in oligopolistic competition. A firm establishes 
an organizational hierarchy to coordinate its production. First, it is shown that an increase in market 
size leads a firm to choose a more specialized technology. Second, surprisingly, a robust result is 
that an increase in the level of coordination efficiency leads a firm to choose a less specialized 
technology.  
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1. Introduction 
The enormous benefit from specialization is well recognized since the work of Adam Smith. 
When firms adopt more specialized technologies, they need to make organizational changes to 
coordinate new technologies.1 In this paper, we study how coordination costs and market size 
affect a firm’s choice of the degree of specialization of its technology in a general equilibrium 
model in which firms engage in oligopolistic competition. There is a continuum of technologies 
with distinct levels of fixed and marginal costs of production. A more specialized technology has 
a higher fixed cost but a lower marginal cost of production. A firm establishes a hierarchy to 
coordinate its production. Individuals at higher levels of the hierarchy coordinate activities of those 
at lower levels. The total number of tiers in the hierarchy is called the height of the hierarchy. The 
span of control in the hierarchy captures the level of coordination efficiency. That is, if a superior 
can coordinate a higher number of direct subordinates, the level of coordination efficiency 
increases. 
We show that a more specialized technology is associated with a taller hierarchy. The 
reasoning is as follows. A more specialized technology with a higher level of fixed cost is more 
                                                 
1 Historically, higher degrees of increasing returns in military technologies led to significant organizational changes 
in China and Europe. In China, during the Spring-Autumn and the Warring States periods, the adoption of the county 
system was an organizational response to higher degrees of increasing returns in military technologies. In Europe, 
military technologies changed the conduct of war (Parker, 1996). The city-states and city-empires lost out to national 
states when mass armies recruited from a state’s own population became essential to successful warfare (Tilly, 1992). 
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profitable when the level of output is higher, because the higher level of fixed cost can be spread 
to a higher level of output. To produce a higher level of output, even though the marginal cost for 
each unit of output decreases, the total number of workers needed for production increases. To 
coordinate a higher number of workers, a firm establishes a taller hierarchy. 
Interestingly, we show that an increase in the level of coordination efficiency leads a firm 
to choose a less rather than a more specialized technology. The reason is that an increase in the 
level of coordination efficiency increases a firm’s level of total profit, but decreases the marginal 
benefit of choosing a more specialized technology. It is the marginal benefit rather than total profit 
that determines a firm’s choice of the degree of specialization. 
This paper is related to the literature on hierarchies. In a seminal paper, Williamson (1967) 
has studied the wage structure in a corporate hierarchy. Calvo and Wellisz (1978) have shown that 
the hierarchical loss of control limitation of the firm size depends on the nature of the supervision 
process. Qian (1994) has studied a model of hierarchy in which the number of tiers, the span of 
control, and the wage structure are all optimally determined. Like the case when the effort of a 
person is either zero or one in Qian, individuals in the hierarchy receive the same wage rate in this 
model. Garicano (2000) have used a team production approach to study hierarchies. Those models 
provide very detailed studies of hierarchies. One significant difference between this paper and the 
above ones is that this paper studies how market structure affects the hierarchy of a firm and the 
choice of technology in a general equilibrium model while the above papers studies hierarchies in 
isolation. As shown later after Proposition 3, this general equilibrium approach is useful to address 
how coordination efficiency affects a firm’s choice of the degree of specialization when we need 
to determine whether the direct effect of a decrease in marginal benefit or the indirect effect of an 
increase in output dominates. When a firm produces a higher level of output, it needs more labor. 
If we used a partial equilibrium approach without labor market, we would not be able to address 
whether a firm’s output expansion would be consistent with the clearance of the labor market. 
With a general equilibrium approach used here, the labor market also clears.  
This paper is also related to the literature on the division of labor and a firm’s specialization. 
Since Smith (1776), the division of labor has been studied by various authors such as Stigler (1951), 
Rosen (1978), Kim (1989), Yang and Borland (1991), Becker and Murphy (1992), and Zhou 
(2004).2 Stigler (1951) has emphasized the role of the extent of the market in affecting a firm’s 
                                                 
2 See Yang and Ng (1998) for a survey on the literature on the division of labor. 
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degree of specialization. Rosen (1978) has studied a model in which workers differ in their skills 
and the division of labor is determined by a worker’s comparative advantage. Kim (1989) has 
presented a model in which a worker makes investment decisions on the depth and breadth of her 
skills. He shows that a worker’s human capital will be more specialized if market size is larger. 
Yang and Borland (1991) have addressed the implication of learning by doing on growth. In their 
model, an individual is a consumer-producer. An increase in the division of labor means an 
increase in the proportion of output that is sold to other consumer-producers. This paper is most 
closely related to Becker and Murphy (1993) and Zhou (2004). Becker and Murphy (1992) have 
stressed the role of coordination costs in determining the division of labor. There are some 
significant differences between this paper and Becker and Murphy (1992). First, we provide a 
detailed specification of coordination costs. Second, in their model, there is no fixed cost of 
production and firms engage in perfect competition. In this model, with fixed costs of production 
and the existence of increasing returns, firms engage in oligopolistic competition. Zhou (2004) has 
demonstrated the mutual dependence between a firm’s degree of specialization and the extent of 
the market in a general equilibrium model. One crucial difference between this paper and Zhou 
(2004) is that coordination costs are not considered in Zhou (2004). 
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 specifies the organizational hierarchy to 
coordinate a firm’s production. Section 3 sets up the model. First, we address a firm’s choices of 
technology and organizational hierarchy when the number of firms is exogenously given. Second, 
we reexamine a firm’s choices when the number of firms is endogenously determined by the zero-
profit condition. Section 4 discusses some possible generalizations and extensions of the model 
and concludes. 
 
2. Organizational hierarchy to coordinate production 
Modern production could be complicated and firms frequently establish sophisticated 
organizations to coordinate their activities (Chandler, 1990). 3  In this section, we specify the 
organizational hierarchy to coordinate a firm’s production. 
                                                 
3 As discussed in Chandler (1990), during the Second Industrial Revolution, firms established large management 
teams to coordinate large-scale production and distribution. Firms with first-mover advantages in exploiting increasing 
returns in management, production, and distribution established dominant positions in their industries. 
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There is a continuum of goods indexed by a number ]1,0[ . Goods are independent from 
each other. As discussed in Neary (2003), the purpose of the introduction of a continuum of goods 
rather than only one good is to eliminate a firm’s market power in the labor market.4 Otherwise, 
we can view there is only one good in this model. Goods are symmetric in the sense that they have 
the same costs of production and enter a consumer’s utility function in the same way. For a firm 
producing good  , this firm’s level of output is )(x . We usually write )(x  just as x  when 
there is no confusion from not indexing goods. If each unit of output requires   units of workers 
(   later will depend on a firm’s technology), then there are x  workers engaging in direct 
production.  
The firm establishes a corporate hierarchy to coordinate x  workers. In this model, the 
sole purpose of the hierarchy is to coordinate production. The total number of tiers in the hierarchy 
is called the height of the hierarchy. Following Qian (1994), tiers of the hierarchy are denoted by 
subscript t  when counted from the top to the bottom. The number of employers in tier t  is te , 
with 10 e . Workers engaging in direct production are at the level T . Because all workers 
engaging in production need to be coordinated, xeT  . We may interpret the coordination 
process as follows. Individuals in the hierarchy send signals to their superiors. A superior has the 
maximum capacity to process s  signals, where s  is a positive constant larger than one. The 
number of employees in tier t  who are subordinates of a common superior is the span of control 
in tier 1t , and is equal to s . 
Because the span of control is constant in each tier (Williamson, 1967), the number of 
individuals in tier t  is equal to the product of the number of individuals in tier 1t  and the span 
of control: see tt 1 . For simplicity, we restrict our attention to the situation that the number of 
tiers is a continuous rather than a discrete variable (Qian, 1994). A continuous approximation of 
see tt 1  is 
    see tt log

.             (1) 
                                                 
4 When there is only one good and it is produced by a small number of firms, firms will have market power in both 
goods market and labor market. With a continuum of goods and each good is produced by a small number of firms, a 
firm still has market power in the goods market but no market power in the labor market because there is an infinite 
number of firms demanding labor. 
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Integration of equation (1) yields stt ebe
ln , where b is a constant to be determined. Using 
the boundary condition 10 e , we get 1b . Thus, 
st
t ee
ln . With xeT  , the total number of 
tiers in the hierarchy is sxT ln/)(ln  . Thus, the total number of employees in the hierarchy is  
   
s
xdtedte st
sx
t
T
ln
1lnln/)ln(
00
  
 .  
The costs of coordination arise from the wages paid to persons in the coordinating 
hierarchy. If each person in the hierarchy receives a wage rate of w , coordination costs are 
s
wx
ln
)1(  . Thus, coordination costs increase when the number of workers to be coordinated 
( x ) increases. Also, coordination costs decrease with s . That is, if the span of control in the 
hierarchy increases, other things equal, the costs of coordination decrease. In this sense, an increase 
in the magnitude of s  is an increase in the level of organizational efficiency.  
One alternative to the above derivation of coordination costs is to specify a general function 
of coordination costs, with the level of coordination efficiency and output as arguments. However, 
adopting a general function of coordination costs leads to many ambiguous results without clear 
economic intuitions. Thus, it is not tried here. 
 
3. The model 
Labor is the only factor of production. Population size is L , and each individual supplies 
one unit of labor inelastically. The wage rate is w . The price of good   is )(p . If a consumer’s 
consumption of good   is )(c , her utility function is specified as  dc )(ln
1
0 . A consumer’s 
budget constraint is Idcp   )()(
1
0
, where I  is a consumer’s income. When firms earn zero 
profits, a consumer’s income will be equal to the wage rate; when firms earn positive profits, a 
consumer’s income may also include profit income.5 A consumer takes the prices of goods and the 
wage rate as given, and chooses her quantities of consumption of the goods to maximize her utility. 
Her utility maximization leads to the result that the absolute value of a consumer’s elasticity of 
demand for a good is one. 
                                                 
5 Since preferences are assumed to be homothetic, the distribution of firm ownership will not affect the total demand 
for a good. 
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To produce a good, a firm incurs three types of costs: coordination costs, fixed costs, and 
marginal costs. With coordination costs specified in Section 2, we now specify the fixed costs and 
marginal costs of production. Similar to Zhou (2014a, 2014b), to produce a good, we assume that 
there is a continuum of technologies indexed by a positive number n . A higher value of n  
indicates a more specialized technology. For technology n , the fixed costs in terms of labor units 
are )(nf  and the corresponding marginal costs in terms of labor units are )(n . 
Modern production is associated with the extensive use of machines. Machines are fixed 
costs of production. The usage of machines decreases the unit labor requirement. To capture the 
substitution between fixed and marginal costs of production, we assume that 0)(' nf  and 
0)(' n .6 That is, a more specialized technology has higher fixed costs but lower marginal costs 
of production. Young (1928) illustrates that some technologies are more specialized and suitable 
for larger scale production, while some others are less specialized and are suitable for smaller 
production needs. 
 
“It would be wasteful to make a hammer to drive a single nail: it would be better to use 
whatever awkward implement lies conveniently at hand. It would be wasteful to furnish a 
factory with an elaborate equipment of specially constructed jigs, gauges, lathes, drills, presses 
and conveyors to build a hundred automobiles; it would be better to rely mostly upon tools and 
machines of standard types, so as to make a relatively larger use of directly-applied and a 
relatively smaller use of indirectly-applied labor. Mr. Ford’s methods would be absurdly 
uneconomical if his output were very small, and would be unprofitable even if his output were 
what many other manufacturers of automobiles would call large.” (Young, 1928, p. 530) 
 
Here we provide some examples of the choice of the degree of specialization of 
technologies. First, container ports are more specialized than traditional ports. Compared with 
traditional terminals, container terminals are ten times costlier to build and can handle volumes of 
trade more than twenty times higher (Levinson, 2006). Second, the movement of some goods 
requires specialized vessels such as oil tanks (Stopford, 2009). Oil tanks are specialized to 
                                                 
6 We also assume that 0)('' nf  and 0)('' n . That is, when firms adopt more advanced technologies, fixed costs 
increase at a nondecreasing rate and marginal costs decrease at a nonincreasing rate. 
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transport oil and may not be convenient in transporting other goods. High volume of trade makes 
it profitable to adopt oil tanks.  
For a firm producing good   with output )(x , its total revenue is )()(  xp . Its fixed 
production costs are wf )( , marginal production costs are wx )()(  , and coordination costs 
are 
s
wx
ln
]1)()([  .7 Thus, total costs for a firm are w
s
x
xf 



 
ln
1 . As a result, a firm’s 
profit as the difference between total revenue and total costs is 
   w
s
x
xfxp 



 
ln
1 .           (2) 
For good  , there are )(m  identical firms producing it. Firms producing the same good 
engage in Cournot competition. In a Cournot-Nash equilibrium, a firm takes the wage rate and 
output of other firms producing the same good as given, and chooses its levels of output and 
technology to maximize its profit.8  A firm’s optimal choice of output requires that marginal 
revenue equals marginal cost: w
sp
x
x
pp 



 





ln
111 . Remembering that utility 
maximization of a consumer leads to a unitary elasticity of demand for a good. Combination of 
this result of utility maximization with the above condition for a firm’s optimal choice of output 
shows that a firm’s price is determined by the number of firms in the industry and its marginal 
cost:9 
   w
sm
p 



 



 
ln
1111 .            (3) 
A firm’s optimal choice of technology yields the following first order condition with 
respect to n : 
                                                 
7 Here the ratio between non-production workers (workers in the hierarchy) and production workers is an increasing 
function of output. 
8 In this model, when a firm chooses its technology, it takes the output of other firms producing the same good as 
given. This assumption that firms do not internalize the strategic effect on rivals is consistent with the "open loop" 
approach in the R&D literature with oligopoly such as Vives (2008). Vives has addressed the impact of the degree of 
competition on R&D spending under both the open loop and the closed loop (in which the strategic interaction effect 
is considered) approaches. He demonstrates that the incorporation of the strategic interaction has an ambiguous impact 
on comparative static results under free entry. In this paper, we do not focus on a firm’s strategic choice of technology 
and we are mainly interested in how coordination efficiency affects a firm’s technology choice. For simplicity, we 
adopt the open loop approach. 
9 For a detailed illustration of the derivation of this type of result, see Zhou (2015, p. 673). 
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   0
ln
)ln1('' 
s
sxf  .            (4) 
 The second order condition requires that  
0
ln
)ln1('''' 
s
sxf  .              (5) 
With 0)('' nf  and 0)('' n  in footnote 6, the second order condition is always 
satisfied. This second order condition is used later to sign comparative statics. 
 For the labor market, demand for labor from a firm is 
s
x
xf
ln
1   and total demand 
for labor from firms is  d
s
xxfm 



  ln
11
0
. Supply of labor is L . The clearance of the 
labor market requires  
    Ld
s
xxfm 



   ln
11
0
.           (6) 
 To close the model, we need to determine the profit of a firm. Depending on whether the 
number of firms is exogenously given or endogenously determined, a firm may earn a positive 
profit or a zero profit. In the following, we study the two scenarios in turn. 
 
3.1. Exogenous number of firms 
 In this subsection, we study firms’ choices of their degrees of specialization of technologies 
when the number of firms is exogenously given.10 
For the goods market, the value of output produced by one firm is xp  and the total value 
of output produced by all firms is xdpm
1
0
. Total profits for all firms are 
 dw
s
xxfxpm 







  ln
11
0
 and labor income is Lw . Thus, the total demand for goods 
is Lwdw
s
xxfxpm 







   ln
11
0
. Goods market clearance requires  
                                                 
10 One justification of this assumption is that governments in developing countries may use licenses to restrict the 
number of firms in strategic industries or incumbent firms may have patents to prevent other firms from entering their 
industries. 
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    xdmp
1
0
Lwdw
s
xxfxpm 







   ln
11
0
.              (7) 
In a symmetric equilibrium, a consumer purchases the same amount of each good. Also, 
there is the same number of firms producing each good and all goods have the same price and 
output. Since the measure of goods is one and all goods are symmetric, we drop the integration 
operator. When the number of firms is exogenously given, equations (3), (4), (6), and (7) form a 
system of four equations defining four variables p , x , n , and w  as functions of exogenous 
parameters. An equilibrium with an exogenously given number of firms is a tuple ( p , x , n , w ) 
satisfying equations (3), (4), (6), and (7). For the rest of the paper, the price of a good is normalized 
to one: 1p . 
When equations (3), (4), and (6) are satisfied, equation (7) is automatically satisfied. That 
is, one equation is redundant. With Walras’ law in mind, this redundancy is not surprising. 
Equations (3), (4), and (6) form the following system of three equations defining three variables 
n , x  and w  as functions of exogenous parameters. 
   0
11
ln
)ln1(
1 


 
ms
ws
,          (8a) 
   0'
ln
ln1'2 


  x
s
sf  ,           (8b) 
   0
ln
1
3 


  L
s
xxfm  .          (8c) 
Partial differentiation of equations 1 , 2 , and 3  with respect to x , n , w , m , s , and 
L  yields 
  dL
L
ds
s
s
s
dm
m
m
dw
dx
dn
x
xn
wn



































































































3
3
2
1
3
1
3
22
11
0
0
0
00
0
0
.         (9) 
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 Let   denote the determinant of the coefficient matrix of endogenous variables of (9): 
xnw 




 321 . Since 01 


w
, 02 


n
, and 03 


x
, it is clear that 0 . With   
nonsingular, a unique equilibrium exists. 
When population size increases, market size increases. The following proposition studies 
the impact of a change in market size on a firm’s choice of the degree of specialization. 
 
 Proposition 1: When market size increases, the wage rate increases, a firm produces a 
higher level of output and chooses a more specialized technology, and the height of its 
organizational hierarchy increases. 
 Proof: An application of Cramer’s rule on the system (9) yields 
    0/321 





LxndL
dw
, 
    0/321 





LnwdL
dx
, 
    0/321 





LxwdL
dn
. 
With sxT ln/)(ln  , the height of the organizational hierarchy T  is positively 
correlated with x . From equation (4), a firm’s output is 
)ln1('
ln'
s
sfx


 .             (10) 
Thus, 
)ln1('
ln'
s
sfx



 . Differentiation of x  with respect to n yields 
    


 

 2)'(
'''')''''(
)ln1(
ln)(

 fff
s
s
dn
xd . 
Plugging the value of x from equation (10) into equation (5), it can be shown that 
0''''''   ff . Thus, 0/)( dnxd  . ■ 
 
The intuition behind Proposition 1 is as follows. An increase in market size has two effects. 
First, demand for a good increases. This leads to the adoption of a more specialized technology. 
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With a more specialized technology, the marginal cost of production for each unit of output 
decreases. This decreases the number of workers needed to produce a unit of output. Second, 
because the level of output increases with the degree of specialization, the latter effect tends to 
increase the number of workers employed by a firm. Overall the latter effect dominates and the 
total number of workers employed by a firm increases with the level of specialization. To 
coordinate a higher number of workers, a firm establishes a taller hierarchy. Thus, a more 
specialized technology is associated with a taller hierarchy.   
 For empirical research on the importance of market size on the division of labor, 
Baumgardner (1988) has shown that doctors are more specialized in larger cities. Garicano and 
Hubbard (2005, 2007) have demonstrated that the share of lawyers working in field-specialized 
firms increases with the size of the market.  
While restricting entry can increase a firm’s market power and decrease efficiencies, the 
following proposition studying the impact of a change in the number of firms provides a reason to 
restrict entry in some cases. 
 
 Proposition 2: A decrease in the number of firms induces a firm to produce a higher level 
of output and choose a more specialized technology, and industry output decreases. The impact on 
the wage rate is ambiguous.  
 Proof: An application of Cramer’s rule on the system (9) yields 
    0
/
//
3
3321 








x
m
mnwdm
dx
, 
0/321 






mxwdm
dn
, 
















 /321321
xnmmxndm
dw . 
 Industry output is mx . We have  
)ln1(
ln
ln
1
)ln1(
ln
/
/)(
3
3
s
s
s
f
s
s
m
Lx
x
mmx
dm
dxmx
dm
mxd





 






.  
Since a firm’s fixed cost cannot be negative, 0
ln
1 
s
f . Thus 0/)( dmmxd . 
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 Because the sign of 
xnmmxn 










 321321  is ambiguous, the sign of 
dm
dw  is 
ambiguous. ■ 
 
 Proposition 2 shows that a lower degree of competition (as measured by the number of 
firms) encourages firms to adopt more specialized technologies. To understand Proposition 2, 
when the number of firms decreases, each firm produces a higher level of output. Thus, a firm 
adopts a more specialized technology. The reason is that the higher fixed costs associated with a 
more specialized technology can be spread to a higher level of output. 
 Social welfare can be measured by the sum of utilities of consumers and profits of firms. 
Will a decrease in the number of firms increase or decrease social welfare? Since a decrease in the 
number of firms increases profits while the impact on the wage rate is ambiguous, overall the 
impact on social welfare is ambiguous. 
Industrial policies of Japan and South Korea have attracted much attention. Scholars have 
argued that governments in Japan and South Korea used licenses to prevent too many firms from 
entering strategic industries. The restriction of entry would decrease the degree of competition in 
an industry and a lower degree of competition could harm the level of economic efficiency. Then 
why did government try to restrict entry? In Proposition 2, a decrease in the number of 
manufacturing firms leads to a higher level of output for each firm and the adoption of more 
advanced technologies in the manufacturing sector. More advanced technologies lead to a lower 
marginal cost of production. Chang (2003) has argued that in many industries the inefficiency 
losses from failing to achieve the minimum efficient scales of production dominate the inefficiency 
losses from monopoly pricing. Thus, Proposition 2 provides a rationale for the practice of 
restricting entry in Japan and South Korea: the existence of too many firms in an industry could 
harm the adoption of increasing returns technologies and thus lead to a lower level of overall 
economic efficiency. 
 Technological progresses such as the invention of telephones and telegraphs and the usage 
of railways can increase the level of organizational efficiency. Improvements in institutions such 
as a better legal environment can also increase the level of organizational efficiency. By applying 
envelop theorem on equation (2), we get 0
)(ln
)1(
2 


 w
s
xs
ssd
d 
: an increase in the level of 
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coordination efficiency always increases a firm’s profit. Thus, an increase in the level of 
coordination efficiency benefits a firm. But will a higher level of coordination efficiency always 
lead a firm to adopt a more specialized technology? The following proposition addresses this 
question. 
 
 Proposition 3: When the number of firms is exogenously given, an increase in the level of 
coordination efficiency leads a firm to produce a higher level of output and choose a less 
specialized technology. 
 Proof: Partial differentiation of (8a)-(8c) yields 
   3
3232
)(ln
)ln1('
ss
sm
xssx








 
. 
An application of Cramer’s rule on the system (9) yields 
  0/321 






snwds
dx
, 
0/32321 













xssxwds
dn . ■ 
  
 The intuition behind Proposition 3 is as follows. From equation (4), when a firm chooses 
its degree of specialization, it compares the marginal cost and marginal benefit from adopting a 
more specialized technology. The marginal cost of a more specialized technology comes from 
increased fixed costs. The marginal benefit of a more specialized technology is that coordination 
costs and marginal costs of production decrease. When the level of coordination efficiency 
increases, there are two effects. First, the direct effect is that the saving on coordination costs 
decreases. That is, the marginal benefit of a more specialized technology decreases. This will 
decrease a firm’s incentive to adopt a more specialized technology. Second, the indirect effect is 
that a firm’s level of output increases. This will increase a firm’s incentive to adopt a more 
specialized technology. The two effects work in opposite directions and the direct effect dominates 
the indirect one. Thus, an increase in the level of coordination efficiency leads a firm to choose a 
less specialized technology. 
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 The following table summarizes comparative statics for an exogenous number of firms. A 
positive (negative) sign indicates a positive (negative) relationship between two variables. A 
question mark indicates the relationship is ambiguous. 
 
Table 1: Comparative statics for an exogenous number of firms 
 Market size Number of firms Coordination efficiency 
Wage rate: w + ? ? 
Output: x + - + 
Technology: n + - - 
Hierarchy height: T + - + 
 
3.2. Endogenous number of firms 
 In some cases, the level of fixed costs determines the number of firms in an industry.11 In 
this section, we study a firm’s choice of the degree of specialization when the zero-profit condition 
determines the number of firms.12   
The zero-profit condition for a firm requires 
0
ln
1 



  w
s
x
xfxp
 .         (11) 
The clearance of goods market requires  
    wLxdmp  
1
0
.           (12) 
Equations (3), (4), and (6) are still valid when the zero-profit condition determines the 
number of firms endogenously. Together with equations (11) and (12), those equations form a 
system of five equation defining five variables m , p , x , n , and w  as functions of exogenous 
parameters. An equilibrium in which the number of firms is endogenously determined is a tuple 
( m , p , x , n , w ) satisfying equations (3), (4), (6), (11), and (12).13 
                                                 
11 For some examples of models in which firms engage in Cournot competition and earn zero profits, see Dasgupta 
and Stiglitz (1980), Zhang (2007), and Chen and Shieh (2011). 
12 To facilitate analysis, the number of firms in this model is a real number rather than restricted to be an integer 
number. With a real number of firms, a firm may make a profit exactly equaling zero. 
13 When equations (3), (4), (6), and (11) are satisfied, equation (12) is automatically satisfied. That is, one equation is 
redundant. With Walras’ law in mind, this redundancy is not surprising. 
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To conduct comparative statics, the above system of five equations defining the 
equilibrium in which the number of firms is endogenously determined is reduced to the following 
system of three equations defining three variables x , n , and w  as functions of exogenous 
parameters.14 
   0
ln
1
1 


  w
s
x
xfx
 ,        (13a) 
   0'
ln
ln1'2 


  x
s
sf  ,         (13b) 
   0
ln
)ln1(13 


  wL
s
swx  .        (13c) 
Partial differentiation of equations 1 , 2 , and 3  with respect to x , n , w , s , and L  
yields 
   dL
L
ds
s
s
s
dw
dn
dx
wnx
nx
wx




















































































3
3
2
1
333
22
11
0
0
0
0
.        (14) 
 Let   denote the determinant of the coefficient matrix of endogenous variables of the 
system (14). Stability of (14) requires that 0 .15   
 The following proposition revisits the impact of an increase in the level of coordination 
efficiency on a firm’s choice of the degree of specialization when the zero-profit condition 
determines the number of firms endogenously. Together with Proposition 3, the two propositions 
show that the result that an increase in coordination efficiency leads firms to choose less 
specialized technologies is robust regardless of whether the number of firms is exogenously given 
or endogenously determined. 
 
                                                 
14 Equations (13a)-(13c) are derived as follows. First, equation (13a) comes from equation (11). Second, equation (13b) 
comes from equation (4). Third, equation (13c) is derived from equations (3) and (12). 
15 See Samuelson (1983, chap. 9) for a justification of this type of assumption on stability. 
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 Proposition 4: When the number of firms is endogenously determined, an increase in the 
level of coordination efficiency leads a firm to choose a less specialized technology. 
 Proof: Partial differentiation of equations (13a)-(13c) yields 
  
sxwwsxwxsxsw 






















 321321321321
 
  




 



 



 
s
sxL
s
swx
sss
xxf
ss
x
ln
)ln1(
ln
)ln1(
)(ln
'
ln
1
)(ln
'
22
  
      0
ln
)ln1(
)(ln
)ln1(
)(ln
'
2
2
2 


 
s
swL
s
sxw
ss
 . 
An application of Cramer’s rule on the system (14) yields 
  


























 /321321321321
sxwwsxwxsxswds
dn . 
 With 0 , 0/ dsdn . ■ 
 
 What is the impact of an increase in coordination efficiency on social welfare? Since firms 
earn profits of zero, utilities of consumers measure social welfare. A consumer’s utility increases 
when the wage-price ratio increases. When the level of coordination efficiency increases, since 
consumers are identical and the wage-price ratio increases, social welfare increases.  
 Like the proof of Proposition 4, it can be shown that the level of output, the degree of 
specialization, and the wage rate increase with the size of the population when the number of firms 
is endogenously determined. 
 The following table summarizes comparative statics for an endogenously determined 
number of firms. 
 
Table 2: Comparative statics for an endogenous number of firms 
 Market size Coordination efficiency 
Wage rate: w + + 
Output: x + ? 
Technology: n + - 
Hierarchy height: T + ? 
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5. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have studied how the level of coordination efficiency affects a firm’s 
choice of the degree of specialization of its technology in a general equilibrium model. We have 
established the following results. First, an increase in market size leads a firm to choose a more 
specialized technology. Second, an increase in the level of organizational efficiency leads a firm 
to choose a less rather than more specialized technology. 
There are some possible generalizations and extensions of the model. First, in this model, 
we take the level of coordination efficiency as exogenously given. Studying how factors such as 
institutions affect the level of coordination efficiency and thus the choice of technology will be an 
interesting avenue for future research. Second, in this model, we assume technologies with 
different degrees of specialization are always available. Embedding a firm’s choice of technology 
into a dynamic model with endogenous development of new technologies will be valuable. 
 
Acknowledgements: I thank Zhiqi Chen, David Selover, and two anonymous reviewers for their 
insightful suggestions. I am solely responsible for all remaining errors. 
 
References 
 
Becker, Gary, and Kevin Murphy. 1992. The division of labor, coordination costs, and knowledge. 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 107, 1137-1160. 
 
Calvo, Guillermo, and Stanislaw Wellisz. 1978. Supervision, loss of control, and the optimal size 
of the firm. Journal of Political Economy 86, 943-952. 
 
Chandler, Alfred. 1990. Scale and Scope: The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism. Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press. 
 
Chang, Ha-Joon. 2003. Kicking Away the Ladder: Development Strategy in Historical Perspective. 
London, UK: Anthem Press. 
 
 18
Chen, Ming Chieh, and Yeung-Nan Shieh. 2011. Specific commodity taxes, output and location 
decision under free entry oligopoly. Annals of Regional Science, 47(1): 25-36. 
 
Dasgupta, Partha, and Joseph Stiglitz. 1980. Industrial structure and the nature of innovative 
activity. Economic Journal 90, 266-293. 
 
Garicano, Luis. 2000. Hierarchies and the organization of knowledge in production. Journal of 
Political Economy 108, 874-904. 
 
Garicano, Luis and Thomas Hubbard. 2007. Managerial leverage is limited by the extent of the 
markets: hierarchies, specialization, and the utilization of lawyers’ human capital. Journal of Law 
and Economics 50, 1-45. 
 
Kim, Sunwong. 1989. Labor specialization and the extent of the market. Journal of Political 
Economy 97, 692-705. 
 
Levinson, Marc. 2006. The Box: How the Shipping Container Made the World Smaller and the 
World Economy Bigger. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
 
Neary, P. J. 2003. The road less traveled: oligopoly and competition policy in general equilibrium, 
in (R. Arnott, B. Greenwald, R. Kanbur and B. Nalebuff, eds.), Economics for An Imperfect World: 
Essays in Honor of Joseph E. Stiglitz, pp. 485-500, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
 
Parker, Geoffrey. 1996. The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 
1500-1800. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Qian, Yingyi. 1994. Incentives and loss of control in an optimal hierarchy. Review of Economic 
Studies 61, 527-544. 
 
Rosen, Sherwin. 1978. Substitution and division of labor. Economica, 45, 235-250. 
 
 19
Samuelson, Paul. 1983. Foundations of Economic Analysis. Enlarged edition, Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press. 
 
Smith, Adam. 1776 (1976). The Wealth of Nations. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Stigler, George. 1951. The division of labor is limited by the extent of the market. Journal of 
Political Economy 59, 185-193. 
 
Stopford, Martin. 2009. Maritime Economics, 3rd edition, New York, NY: Routledge. 
 
Tilly, Charles. 1992. Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1992. Cambridge, MA: 
Blackwell Publishing. 
 
Vives, Xavier. 2008. Innovation and competitive pressure. Journal of Industrial Economics 56, 
419-469. 
 
Williamson, Oliver. 1967. Hierarchical control and optimal firm size. Journal of Political 
Economy 75, 123-138. 
 
Yang, Xiaokai, and Jeff Borland. 1991. A microeconomic mechanism for economic growth. 
Journal of Political Economy 99, 460-482. 
 
Yang, Xiaokai, and Siang Ng. 1998. Specialization and division of labor: a survey. in Increasing 
Returns and Economic Analysis, edited by Kenneth Arrow, Ng, K., and Xiaokai Yang, New York: 
St. Martin Press. 
 
Young, Allyn. 1928. Increasing Returns and Economic Progress. Economic Journal 38, 527-542. 
 
Zhang, Junxi. 2007. Endogenous markups, intensity of competition, and persistence of business 
cycles. Southern Economic Journal 74, 546-565. 
 
 20
Zhou, Haiwen. 2004. The division of labor and the extent of the market. Economic Theory 24, 
195-209. 
 
Zhou, Haiwen. 2014a. Intermediate inputs and external economies. Frontiers of Economics in 
China 9, 216-239. 
 
Zhou, Haiwen. 2014b. International trade with increasing returns in the transportation sector, 
Frontiers of Economics in China 9, 606-633. 
 
Zhou, Haiwen. 2015. Unemployment and economic integration for developing countries. 
Frontiers of Economics in China 10, 664-690. 
